Introduction
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) (U.S. Congress 2002) mandates the disclosure of whether the audit committee includes a financial expert. ' However, the operationalization of who is a financial expert was and still is a controversial issue (Plitch and Ceron 2003) . Some have argued that effective audit committee members are those who have general management experience rather than those who have an accounting or financial background (Olson 1999) . The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) initially proposed a narrow definition to include only accounting financial experts -that is, directors with experience as a certified public accountant (CPA), auditor, chief financial officer (CFO), controller, or chief accounting officer. Subsequently, the SEC defined financial expert broadly to include nonaccounting financial experts, such as directors with experience as a chief executive officer (CEO) or president (SEC 2003) .2 Was the SEC correct in defining financial experts to include both accounting and nonaccounting experts? Do accounting financial experts enhance the quality of financial reporting more than nonaccounting financial experts? These are important questions because the primary objective of SOX was to restore credibility to the U.S. financial reporting system, which was tarnished by several high-profile accounting scandals. Because the audit committee is the ultimate monitor of the financial reporting process, the audit committee's financial expertise is a key determinant of its effectiveness (Treadway 1987) . We contribute to this debate by separately examining the association between the audit committee's accounting financial expertise and nonaccounting financial expertise and several attributes of financial reporting quality.
Our primary measure of financial reporting quality is accounting conservatism. We focus on conservatism for several reasons. Several scholars recognize the long-standing infiuence of accounting conservatism on accounting practice. For example, Basu (1997) notes that conservatism has infiuenced accounting practice for at least 500 years. Sterling (1970) rates conservatism as the most infiuential principle of valuation in accounting. Ball (2001) argues that conservatism is a fundamental characteristic of financial reporting. Watts (2003a, b) emphasizes that conservatism facilitates effective monitoring of managers and contracts by constraining overpayments to managers and other parties.3 Furthennore, the recent accounting scandals in the United States and elsewhere, and a record number of restatements of financial statements, have underscored the importance of conservative financial reporting. Despite the long history and the importance associated with conservatism, surprisingly, there is limited empirical evidence of the relation between the audit committee characteristics and conservatism.'* We also examine the relation between the audit committee's financial expertise and the Q score developed by Penman and Zhang 2002 . Penman and Zhang refer to the Q score as an "eamings quality indicator", and provide evidence that the Q score has predictive power for one-year-ahead retum on net operating assets (RNOA) incremental to past RNOA.
Audit committee members with accounting financial expertise are expected to enhance accounting conservatism through their better monitoring capability driven by their knowledge base, job expectations as demanded by the audit committee charter, and economic incentives to mitigate the risk of litigation and protect their reputation capital.
We measure audit committee expertise in three ways: accounting financial experts, nonaccounting financial experts, and nonfinancial experts (directors who are neither accounting nor nonaccounting financial experts). We use multiple proxies to capture conservatism. We use two accruals-based measures developed by Givoiy and Hayn 2000, a measure that is derived from the book-to-market ratio (Beaver and Ryan 2000) , and a conservatism score developed by Penman and Zhang 2002 to capture unrecorded assets on the balance sheet. We also use Ball and Shivakumar's 2005 asymmetric loss recognition test, an altemative measure of conservatism.Ô ur control variables include several other characteristics of the audit committee and the board.
Our sample firms come from the Standard & Poor's (S&P) 500, and the total number of firm-year observations is 929 (633 for the conservative score measure) representing years 2000 through 2002. We find that, in general, accounting conservatism is not correlated with nonaccounting financial expertise or nonfinancial expertise. However, accounting financial expertise is positively and significantly correlated with all but one measure (book-to-market ratio) of conservatism. Results based on the Q score indicate a positive and significant relation between accounting financial expertise and the Q score. We also find that the accounting financial experts on the audit committee are able to effectively perform their monitoring function and promote conservative accounting only when they are in boards that are characterized by strong govemance. This finding holds for all four measures of conservatism. It appears that in weak boards the presence of accounting financial expertise on the audit committee is ineffective in promoting conservative accounting -that is, the effect of accounting financial expertise is undermined by weak govemance mechanisms. We also consider the possibility that attributes of corporate boards and govemance mechanisms may be endogenously determined. When we control for endogeneity, results are significant for the book-to-market measure as well as for the other measures of conservatism. Overall, the findings suggest that accounting financial expertise has a broader impact on financial reporting beyond accounting conservatism.
We make several contributions. First, we contribute to the debate on the appropriate definition of a financial expert under SOX. By including both accounting financial expertise and nonaccounting financial expertise in the same model, ours is the first study that directly tests the relation between these two types of financial expertise with accounting conservatism. We provide empirical evidence that is consistent with the SEC's initial narrow definition to include only accounting financial experts. This finding has implications for boards of directors and regulators in other countries who are considering measures to enhance the effectiveness of audit committees.
Second, DeFond, Hann, and Hu (2005) consider two competing explanations for the favorable market reaction to the appointment of experts to the audit committee: monitoring (i.e., the appointment of an expert improves the committee's oversight) and signaling (i.e., the appointment is a credible signal to the investors that the firm takes financial reporting seriously. The two explanations are not mutually exclusive and DeFond et al. (2005) interpret their evidence as consistent with the monitoring explanation. Engel (2005) , however, notes that the market reaction is an expectation of value enhancement, not a direct measure of actual or ultimate improvements associated with the appointment. Our finding that only accounting financial expertise is associated with conservatism is consistent with the monitoring explanation. That differentiation is important because it opens up the "black box" -that is, it contributes to our understanding of why the stock market reacts favorably to the appointment of accounting experts but not nonaccounting experts to the audit committee.
Third, we contribute to the growing literature on the consequences of the audit committee's expertise on financial reporting quality (Xie, Davidson, and Bodealt 2003; Bedard, Chtourow, and Courteau 2004; Agrawal and Chadha 2005; J. Krishnan 2005) .6 Whereas prior research implies that financial expertise will have a favorable impact on financial reporting quality for the average firm, we extend the literature by providing evidence that overall govemance quality accentuates the effect of accounting expertise on conservatism. This finding has important implications for the boards of directors, auditors, and investors.
Fourth, we also provide empirical evidence on the association between the Q score, a measure of eamings quality, and the accounting expertise of the members of the audit committee. Thus, by examining multiple measures of conservatism as well as the Q score, we provide an analysis of the impact of the audit committee's expertise on financial reporting that is more comprehensive than prior studies that examined a single attribute of financial statements.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related research and develops the hypothesis. Section 3 describes the research method and the sample selection process. Section 4 provides our results and conclusions.
Hypothesis
Traditionally, the audit committee has oversight of financial reporting, including the annual and quarterly financial statements, disclosures in regulatory filings, eamings releases, pro forma information, and eamings guidance (Steinberg 2005) . The Blue Ribbon Committee (1999) notes that the audit committee is the ultimate monitor of the financial reporting process. Recently, a survey by PricewaterhouseCoopers 2005 asked directors to rank seven dimensions of an effective board. The audit committee's ability to monitor the accuracy of financial reporting was ranked as the most important dimension. This finding underscores the significance of audit committees as a govemance mechanism. Watts (2003a) argues that the board of directors has at least two reasons to be interested in conservatism: conservatism could restrain managers' ability to overcompensate themselves by aggressive accounting and conservatism could offset managers' tendencies to report good news more than bad news. Although Watts's arguments for the demand for conservatism are made from the overall board perspective, there are several reasons why the members of the audit committeespecifically the directors with accounting expertise -would promote conservatism. Our arguments for the audit committee directors with expertise derive from the fact that they, among all board or audit committee members, have the best ability to distinguish among accounting policies (as conservative or aggressive), and they have incentives, more so than other directors, to promote conservatism. More specifically, audit committee members with accounting expertise could potentially enhance conservatism for three reasons: (a) having accounting expertise provides the ability to assess the nature and the appropriateness of the accounting choices made by the managers; (b) provisions in audit committee charters frequently require the members to examine the aggressiveness or conservatism of accounting policies, thereby placing a demand on members' expertise; and (c) risk of litigation and in particular the potential loss of reputation capital for those with accounting expertise provide further incentives for such members to promote accounting conservatism. We elaborate on these reasons below.
Financial expertise
The Treadway Commission (1987) concluded that the experience and expertise of the members of an audit committee are an important dimension of an audit committee's effectiveness. Audit committee members with accounting financial expertise can enhance conservatism by assessing the adequacy of provisions for matters such as warranty obligations, lawsuits, and other contingencies, and appraise the overall quality of financial reporting. Also, they can examine the reasonableness of explanations provided by management, and in particular detect the nature of disagreements between management and the extemal auditor (DeZoort and Salterio 2001). There is a long and growing literature on the relation between an audit committee's financial expertise and attributes of financial reporting, and researchers have begun to examine the effects of accounting versus nonaccounting financial expertise. Kalbers and Fogarty (1993) examine whether an audit committee's power is associated with its effectiveness. They argue that because audit committees are composed of individuals, the members' personal attributes influence the committees' effectiveness. One dimension of power is "expert power"; that is, members skilled in accounting and finance could contribute to the committee's effectiveness. Kalbers and Fogarty find that expert power is highly associated with financial reporting effectiveness. Similarly, McMuUen and Raghunandan (1996) provide evidence that firms with financial reporting problems are less likely to have CPAs on the audit committee.
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McDaniel, Martin, and Maines (2002) conduct an experiment to study the effects of financial expertise and financial literacy on financial reporting. They use audit managers and Executive MBA graduates as surrogates for financial experts and financial literates, respectively. Borrowing from research on cognitive psychology, McDaniel et al. (2002) argue that experts' episodic knowledge about financial reporting quality represents both first-hand experiences (training and professional certification) with relevant problems and second-hand experiences -for example, interactions with other experts. However, episodic knowledge of literates is derived from second-hand information. McDaniel et al. point out that the secondhand exposure to a financial reporting issue is likely to be more limited and erode over time because literates may not reinforce or further develop their framework through practical experience. In other words, relative to the literates, experts possess experience-based and well-developed frameworks to raise concems regarding treatment of items that may contribute to misstatement of financial statements or poor reporting quality.'' Consistent with their predictions, McDaniel et al. find that financial experts possess a framework for evaluating financial reporting quality that is more consistent with the Financial Accounting Standards Board's (FASB) conceptual framework. They conclude that having financial experts on the audit committee is likely to bring a focus on issues that may receive a lower priority if only financial literates were on the audit committee.
Several recent studies examine the relation between an audit committee's financial expertise and eamings management, although the definition of financial expertise varies. Xie et al. (2003) and Bedard et al. (2004) provide evidence that the financial sophistication of the board and the audit committee is an important factor in constraining the propensity of managers to engage in eamings management. Agrawal and Chadha (2005) find that the probability of restating financial statements is significantly lower when the audit committee has an independent financial expert. This finding is consistent with the notion that independent directors with financial expertise provide valuable oversight over financial reporting. DeFond et al. (2005) conduct an event study for a sample of firms appointing accounting and nonaccounting financial experts to their audit committees and find a positive stock market reaction only for appointments of accounting experts. This finding suggests that appointing a nonaccounting expert to the audit committee is treated as a nonevent by the market participants. Conversely, appointing an accounting expert is expected to enhance corporate govemance through increased monitoring. Karamanou and Vafeas (2005) study several attributes of audit committees, including expertise, and find that firms with effective govemance mechanisms are more likely to make or update a management forecast. This finding is stronger for bad news when investors are at most risk of suffering wealth losses. Finally, Zhang, Zhou, and Zhou (2007) provide evidence that firms are more likely to be identified with an intemal control weakness under SOX if their audit committees have less accounting financial expertise. Overall, the empirical evidence reviewed here supports the notion that members of the audit committee with accounting financial expertise possess experience-based and well-developed frameworks to assess accounts' conservatism, and can evaluate the explanations provided by management.
Expectations of the audit committee charter
The roles and responsibilities of the members of the audit committee are usually described in the audit committee charter. We reviewed the audit committee charter for several firms and generally found a high degree of consistency in terms of job expectations, including reference to accounting conservatism.^ We provide two examples from the audit committee charters below.
Ruby Tuesday:
As part of its oversight responsibility, the Committee shall provide for the following to ensure the credibility of financial reporting: ... Ensure that management and the Auditor discuss with the Committee their qualitative judgments about the appropriateness, not just the acceptability, of accounting principles and financial disclosure practices used or proposed to be adopted by the Company and, particularly, about the degree of aggressiveness or conservatism of its accounting principles and underlying estimates.
eBay:
The Audit Committee shall ... discuss with the independent auditors the results of the annual audit, including the auditors' assessment of the quality and conservatism [of accounting principles] ... Thus, to fulfill the expectations of the audit committee charter, audit committee members need to understand not only the accounting principles and estimates used but also whether those principles and estimates are more conservative relative to other principles and estimates. Though meeting the expectations of the audit charter applies to all audit committee directors, it is natural that directors who lack accounting financial expertise would tum to directors with accounting expertise for leadership on matters conceming financial reporting issues. This is the fundamental reason for recruiting a financial expert to serve on the committee in the first place. Thus, the obligation to fulfill the expectations of the audit committee charter, particularly with regard to conservatism, is greater for those directors with accounting financial expertise relative to directors who lack such expertise. Basu (1997) iu-gues that litigation risk against auditors is an important driver of conservatism. We believe that the same argument also applies to the members of an audit committee. Like auditors, members of the audit committee face an asymmetric loss function and bear significant reputation costs in the event of financial fraud or a material misstatement of financial statements. For example, KPMG's Audit Committee Institute (2006) surveyed 1,200 audit committee members in 17 countries and found that members of the audit committee felt that they are exposed to a higher level of litigation risk and financial prosecution than any other members of the board. Furthermore, this sentiment of greater exposure to lawsuits is highest in North America. Do courts hold directors with financial expertise to a higher standard than other directors? In a recent decision involving Emerging Communications, Inc., where the shareholders sued the board for breach of fiduciary duty, the Delaware Chancery Court held one director to a higher standard than the other directors because he had specialized financial expertise while several other directors were not found liable (Cost and Miller 2005) . This is an interesting development because SOX provides a safe harbor for financial experts from additional liability from the federal securities laws. However, fiduciary obligations are imposed on directors by state law, and, thus, directors could be sued under the state law as in the case of Emerging Communications, Inc. This example indicates that the risk of litigation could be higher for directors who are financial experts relative to other directors.
Economic incentives
In addition to fines and damages awarded against the members of the audit committee, outside directors with a poor track record of monitoring are disciplined by the managerial labor market (Milgrom and Roberts 1992; Gerety and Lehn 1997) . Srinivasan (2005) examines the loss in the number of other directorships held by the director in the three years following the announcement of a restatement of financial statements. He concludes that audit committee directors, on average, lose more other directorships than do nonaudit committee directors. This is consistent with the notion that audit committee directors bear more responsibility for financial reporting oversight relative to other directors. Furthermore, Srinivasan finds that for a sample of firms with income-decreasing restatements, the coefficient on financial experts is positive and statistically significant. In other words, financial experts lose more directorships than nonfinancial experts. Thus, in the event of financial reporting failure, the market for directors appears to discipline financial experts more than nonfinancial experts. Interestingly, the financial expert coefficient is positive but not significant for firms with income-increasing restatements. This finding is consistent with the asymmetric loss function faced by the members of the audit committee. Thus, members of the audit committee, particularly accounting financial experts, have incentives to enhance accounting conservatism to mitigate the risk of litigation and the consequential reputation loss.
In summary, the combination of the audit committee members' accounting financial expertise, increasing expectations of the audit committee charter to ensure the credibility of financial reporting -including maintaining conservatism -and the economic incentives of the members of the audit committee to mitigate the risk of litigation and to protect their reputation capital is likely to enhance conservatism through increased monitoring. This line of reasoning leads to the following hypothesis (in altemative form):
HYPOTHESIS. The audit committee's accounting financial expertise is positively associated with accounting conservatism.
Research design and sample

Measures of audit committee's expertise
Following DeFond et al. 2005, we measure expertise in three ways. Accounting financial experts are directors with experience as a certified public accountant, auditor, principal or chief financial officer, controller, or principal or chief accounting officer. Nonaccounting financial experts are directors with experience as the chief executive officer or president of a for-profit corporation. Nonfinancial experts are directors who are neither accounting nor nonaccounting financial experts.
Measures of conservatism
Conservatism is a multifaceted constmct. We use multiple proxies to capture conservatism. Our first measure of conservatism is an accrual-based measure. Givoly and Hayn (2000) state that conservative accounting leads to persistently negative accruals, in contrast with the expected pattern of accrual reversals. Following Ahmed, Billings, Morton, and Stanford-Harris 2002, CONACRU equals income before extraordinary items and discontinued operations plus depreciation expense less operating cash flows deflated by total assets. CONACRU is averaged over a three-year period centered at period t.^ We multiply CONACRU by -1 so that it is increasing in the amount of negative accmals. Our second measure of conservatism is designed to address the issue that accruals in any given period contain accmals of prior periods that reverse during that period. To filter out effects of such reversals, Hui and Matsunaga (2004) use a firm fixed-effect procedure by regressing current period accmals on lagged accmals for each of the prior six years. The coefficient on the lagged accmals would capture the reversals of past accmals. The firm-specific intercept from this fixedeffect regression is thus at least partially free of the effect of past accmals that are reversing. This firm-specific intercept multiplied by -1 is our second measure of conservatism designated as CONACRUF.
Our third measure comes from Ryan 1995 and Beaver and Ryan 2000. They decompose the book-to-market ratio (BTM) into its bias and lag components. Bias means that the book value is persistently lower (higher) than market value, so that BTM is persistently below (above) one. Lag refers to the unexpected economic gains and losses that are recognized in book value over time rather than immediately. Thus, the BTM is temporarily lower but tends to its mean over time. Both bias and lag result from joint effects of the accounting process and the economic environment. Beaver and Ryan estimate the firm-specific intercept, Xi, from the following fixed-effect regression of book-to-market ratio (BTM) on current and six lagged (k = 0-6) annual stock retums (RET). We multiply the firm-specific intercept by -1.
where i and t are firm and year subscripts; bias and lag are captured by Xi and 5^, respectively. Beaver and Ryan show that the bias component is associated with measures of accounting conservatism while lag is not. We refer to Xi as CONBM. Penman and Zhang (2002) compute a conservatism index (C score) to capture the effect of conservative accounting on the balance sheet. It is a measure of unrecorded reserves on the balance sheet. Following Penman and Zhang 2002, our final measure of conservatism, CONCSCO, is the amount of LIFO (last-in, first-out) reserve, research and development (R&D), and advertising reserves scaled by net operating assets for firms that have one or more of the three reserves. LIFO inventory reserve equals LIFO reserve as reported in financial statements. R&D and advertising reserves are calculated based on procedures described in Penman & Zhang 2002 . The advantage of this method is that it directly considers the role of accounting policy choice in conservatism -unlike the other measures. A shortcoming, however, is that not all possible accounting choices are considered. Penman and Zhang (2002) justify considering these three accounting policy choices in the C score because, unlike most other accounting choices, these are either mandated by regulators or changed only rarely.
Empirical model
We estimate the following empirical model:
We define the variables as follows: A positive coefficient for a^ is consistent with our hypothesis that accounting financial expertise is associated with accounting conservatism. We do not offer a prediction for a^ We also do not offer a prediction for «3 or «g because the prior research is mixed. The literature on corporate governance generally suggests a negative consequence arising from larger boards (Jensen 1993; Hermalin and Weisbach 2003) . However, Klein (2002b) finds that independent audit committees are positively correlated with board size. Prior research finds that board independence, audit committee independence, and separation of CEO and chairman of the board are indicative of good governance (Jensen 1993; Beasley 1996; Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney 1996; Klein 2002a ). Therefore, a positive relation is predicted for a^, a^, and aj. Prior research also finds that the frequency of audit committee meetings is negatively associated with fraudulent reporting (Färber 2005) . Thus, a positive relation is expected for «g. Following Ahmed et al. 2002 , we expect ag, ajQ, 01 J, ai2, and 0)3 to be positive. We predict a positive relation for 014 and ajj. Firms operating in industries where the risk of litigation is high have incentives to adopt conservative financial reporting. Similarly, Big 4 auditors have greater marketbased incentives than non-Big 4 auditors to protect their reputation capital and therefore enhance eamings conservatism (Basu, Hwang, and Jan 2000) . Finally, we predict ajg to be positive following Warfield, Wild, and Wild 1995, who find that managerial ownership is associated with the informativeness of eamings. We predict a negative sign for a]7 consistent with prior research that institutional investors may emphasize short-term performance and, thus, greater likelihood of eamings management (Bushee 2004; Kury 2006) . When conservatism is defined as CONCSCO, we do not include RDADV in (2).
Sample and univariate analyses
Our search for sample firms begins with firms that are included in the S&P 500 for the years 2000 through 2002. Like DeFond et al. 2005 , our sample period mostly predates SOX. We limit our sample to the pre-SOX period because more variation in audit committee appointments can be expected during the pre-SOX period. Our focus on larger firms is motivated by prior research (Klein 2002b; Karamanou and Vafeas 2005) . Furthermore, the likelihood of data availability on attributes of boards of directors and attributes of audit committees' expertise is higher for larger firms than for smaller firms, particularly before SOX. A search on COMPUSTAT for the S&P 500 firms yielded 389 firms or 1,167 firm-years (389 X 3 years). We exclude 194 firm-years in financial services industries (Standard Industrial Classification [SIC] codes 6000-6900) because accruals of these firms are likely to be different from accruals of firms in other industries. Next, we exclude 44 firm-years for which either the financial data or the govemance data are unavailable. We handcollect data on the qualifications and experience of the members of the audit committee from proxy statements, 10-K reports, company websites, and other publicly available sources. Thus, the total number of firm-years available to estimate CON-ACRU, CONACRUE, and CONBM is 929 (310 firms). Finally, we exclude 296 firm-years where data are unavailable for any of the three reserves (LIFO inventory, R&D expense, and advertising expense) needed to estimate our final measure of conservatism, CONCSCO (633 firm-years or 211 firms).
Industry distribution for the sample appears in Table 1 . Business equipment, manufacturing, and retail industries collectively represent 48 percent of the total firm-years for conservatism measures CONACRU, CONACRUE, and CONBM and 61 percent for the CONCSCO measure.
Information conceming the presence of financial experts on the audit committee for the sample firms is summarized in Table 2 . It appears that the proportion of firms with at least one accounting financial expert has been gradually increasing over time. Panel B reports the proportion of experts as a percentage of audit committee. For the first year of SOX, accounting experts constitute a little more than a fourth of the audit committees of the sample firms with an accounting expert. It is clear that there are more nonaccounting financial experts than accounting financial experts on the audit committees of the sample firms.
Descriptive statistics for the pooled sample are in Table 3 . The median value for the CONCSCO measure of 0.13 is comparable to the median value reported by Penman and Zhang 2002 for the entire COMPUSTAT sample over the period 1975-97 of 0.11. About 21 percent of the firm-years have at least one accounting financial expert. Only 6 percent of the total audit committee directors qualify as accounting financial experts. The proportion of audit committee directors who are neither accounting financial experts nor nonaccounting financial experts is 36.2 percent. The mean and median values oi ACIND (audit committee independence) are higher than those oí BIND (board indepetidence). The tnean value for NODUAL is 0.21, indicating that for 79 percent of the firm-years, the CEO and the chairman of the board are the same individual. About 87 percent of the total firm-years are audited by the Big 4 auditors. The mean percentages of common stock held by insiders and institutions are, respectively, 3.70 percent and 66.5 percent.
Untabulated correlation coefficients indicate that, as expected, CONACRU and CONACRUE are highly correlated. The correlations between CONCSCO and other measures of conservatism are positive and significant at the 0.01 level. However, CONBM is not significantly correlated with CONACRU or CONACRUF. Turning to the variable of interest, AFINEXP is positively and significantly correlated at the 0.01 level (for a two-tailed test) with all proxies for conservatism except CONBM. The correlation between AEINEXP and CONBM is positive but not significant at the 0.10 level. Also, the correlations between the proxies for conservatism and NEINEXP (the proportion of audit committee directors who are nonfinancial experts) are negative but not significant. Similarly, the correlations between NAEINEXP and the proxies are negative except for CONBM, and only the correlation between NAEINEXP and CONCSCO is significant at the 0.10 level. Overall, these results are consistent with the hypothesis that accounting financial expertise of the audit committee is positively associated with conservatism. 
Note:
Industry classification is based on 11 Fama and French industries excluding money and finance (see http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french).
Next, we examine whether differences in mean and median values of the various conservatism measures between accounting and nonaccounting financial experts are significant. Those results are reported in Table 4 . AFINEXD equals 1 for firmyears with at least one accounting financial expert and 0 for firm-years with only nonaccounting or nonfinancial experts. Both mean and median values of conservatism are higher for firm-years with at least one accounting financial expert relative to firm-years that have only nonaccounting financial experts for all measures except CONBM. Furthennore, the differences in mean and median values are significant at the 0.01 level. These results suggest that greater conservatism is associated with accounting financial experts.
Results
Multivariate results
Results of the multivariate model are reported in Table 5 . To control for industryspecific effects, we include 10 industry-dummy variables based on Fama-French industry classifications (excluding money and finance -see Table 1 ). We also include two year-dummy variables that equal 1 for years 2001 and 2002, respectively, and 0 otherwise to control for time-specific effects (coefficients for the industry-dummy variables and the year-dummy variables are not tabulated).'T he i-statistics in Table 5 are based on Huber-White standard errors that correct for clustering and are robust to heteroscedasticity and serial correlation (Huber 1967; White 1980; Rogers 1993) . 11
The variable of interest AFINEXP is positive for all four measures of conservatism and significant at the 0.05 level or better (for a one-tailed test) for CONACRU, CONACRUF, and CONCSCO. On the other hand, the sign for NAFINEXP is mixed and insignificant for all the four proxies of conservatism. These results are consistent with our hypothesis and indicate that only accounting financial expertise is significantly associated with conservatism. Thus, the broader definition of an accounting expert that is currently in place under SOX appears to weaken accounting conservatism. When we replace NAFINEXF with NFINEXF (nonfinancial expert), it is not significant. Turning to control variables that measure other aspects CONACRU = mean total accruals (net income before extraordinary items plus depreciation less cash flow from operations) scaled by total assets, averaged over three-year period centered on the year of interest and multiplied by -1 (Givoly and Hayn 2000); CONACRUF = fixed-effect measure of total accruals estimated as the firm-specific intercept from a fixed-effect regression of current accruals on lagged accruals for each of the prior six years (Hui and Matsunaga 2004) . The firm-specific intercept is multiplied by -1 ; CONBM = firm-specific intercept, a,, from the following fixed-effect regression of book-to-market ratio (BTM) on current and six lagged (k = 0-6) annual stock retums (RET) (Beaver and Ryan 2000) , multiplied by -1 : of corporate govemance, the sign for BSIZE is mixed and significant at the 0.10 level in two cases. NODUAL, as predicted, is positive except for CONBM and significant for two measures of conservatism. BIND is positive in all four cases and significant in three cases. ACSIZE and ACMEET are not significant in any of the cases. This is consistent with Bedard et al. 2004 , who find that size of the audit committee and the frequency of the meetings are not associated with the likelihood of earnings management. The sign for ACIND is mixed and not significant. INSTOWN is negative, as predicted, and suggests that institutions have a preference for more positive eamings.
Does strong governance enhance the relation between accounting financial expertise and conservatism?
DeFond et al. (2005) report that the positive investor response to accounting financial experts on the audit committee is conditional upon the firm's corporate govemance -that is, accounting expertise is more effective when other govemance mechanisms are already in place. This finding motivates us to examine whether our results are also conditional upon the strength of govemance for the sample firms.'2 Following DeFond et al. 2005, we construct a measure of strong governance {SGOV) that equals 1 if GOV is greater than or equal to the sample median, and 0 otherwise. We define the variables as follows: Table 3 . Each model includes, but does not tabulate, 10 industry dummies based on 11 Fama-French industries (see Table 1 ) and two year dummies that equal 1 for years 2001 and 2002, respectively, and 0 otherwise. For the CONCSCO measure, no observations are available in the utilities industry and thus that model uses only 9 industry dummies.
Significances below are for one-tailed tests where predicted signs are specified and for twotailed tests otherwise. * Significant at the 10 percent level.
1' Significant at the 5 percent level. LGINDEX = a dummy variable that equals 1 if the GINDEX is below the sample median, and 0 otherwise; GINDEX, developed by Gompers, Ishii, and Metriek 2003, measures the strength of a firm's governance system and is constructed based on a simple counting of 24 corporate govemance provisions -a low (high) GINDEX means that a firm has a strong (weak) govemance system; HINSTOWN = a dummy variable that equals 1 if the percentage of institutional ownership (¡NSTOWN) is greater than the sample median, and 0 otherwise.
We interact SGOV with AFINEXP and NAFINEXP to test whether the relation between accounting financial expertise and conservatism is accentuated by strong govemance. Because SGOV includes a variety of govemance variables that we separately consider in the prior analysis, we do not include these other govemance variables in this analysis. Results are reported in Table 6 . Recall that SGOV is a dummy variable that equals 1 for strong governance and 0 otherwise; thus, the coefficients on AFINEXP and NAFINEXF in this model represent the coefficients on these expertise variables for firms with weak govemance, and the sum of the coefficients for AFINEXP and AFINEXP*SGOV (NAFINEXP and NAFINEXP*SGOV) represents the coefficients on expertise for firms with strong govemance. We report the significance testing for the combined coefficients at the bottom of Table 6 .
Results show that neither AFINEXP nor NAFINEXP is significant for three of the four conservatism measures. Thus, for firms with weak govemance mechanisms, audit committee members' accounting financial expertise does not appear to enhance conservatism. For CONBM, the AFINEXP and NAFINEXP variables are negative and significant, implying that the presence of such experts is associated with lower conservatism in firms with weak govemance. In contrast, the incremental effect of strong govemance captured by AFINEXP*SGOV is positive for all four measures of conservatism and statistically significant for three of the four measures. The coefficient on NAFINEXP*SGOV, the incremental effect of nonaccounting financial expertise, is not significant for any of the conservatism measures, nor is the sum of the coefficients NAFINEXP and NAFINEXP*SGOV (not reported). Note that the sum of the coefficients AFINEXP and AFINEXP*SGOV reported at the bottom of the table represents the coefficients for firms with strong govemance and it is positive and significant for all four measures of conservatism, including CONBM. These results indicate that accounting financial experts on the audit committee are able to effectively perform their monitoring function and promote conservative accounting only when they are in boards that are characterized by strong govemance. It appears that in weak boards the presence of financial expertise on the audit committee is ineffective in promoting conservative accountingthat is, the effect of accounting financial expertise is undermined by weak govemance mechanisms. Also, it appears that even in the presence of strong govemance, nonaccounting financial experts are not able to enhance conservatism. 13 in summary, our results corroborate the findings in DeFond et al. 2005 and underscore the contextual nature of the relation between audit committees' accounting financial expertise and accounting conservatism.
Sensitivity ehecks
We conduct a variety of sensitivity checks to assess the robusmess of our results to outliers, altemative variables, and model specifications. We describe our sensitivity checks as follows. When (2) Table 3 . Each model includes, but does not tabulate, 10 industry dummies based on 11 Fama-French industries (see Table 1 ) and two year dummies that equal 1 for years 2001 and 2002, respectively, and 0 otherwise. For the CONCSCO measure, no observations are available in the utilities industry and thus that model uses only 9 industry dummies. SGOV = a dummy variable that equals 1 if GOV is greater than or equal to the sample median, and 0 otherwise; GOV = a summary measure of corporate govemance that is equal to the sum of the following six dichotomous govemance variables: LBSIZE, HBIND, HACSIZE, HACIND, LGINDEX, and HINSTOWN; LBSIZE = a dummy variable that equals 1 if the board size is less than the sample median, and 0 otherwise; HBIND = a dummy variable that equals 1 if the proportion of outside directors is greater than 60 percent, and 0 otherwise; HACSIZE = a dummy variable that equals 1 if the proportion of the number of members on the audit committee to the total number of directors on the board is greater than the sample median, and 0 otherwise; HACIND = a dummy variable that equals 1 if the audit committee is composed of solely independent directors, and 0 otherwise;
LGINDEX = a dummy variable that equals 1 if the GINDEX is below the sample median, and 0 otherwise; GINDEX, developed by Gompers et al. 2003 , measures the strength of a firm's govemance system and is constmcted based on a simple counting of 24 corporate govemance provisions -a low (high) GINDEX means that a firm has a strong (weak) govemance system; HINSTOWN = a dummy variable that equals 1 if the percentage of institutional ownership (¡NSTOWN) is greater than the sample median, and 0 otherwise.
Significances below are for one-tailed tests where predicted signs are specified and for twotailed tests otherwise. * Significant at the 10 percent level. once again support the hypothesis that only accounting financial expertise is associated with accounting conservatism. Furthermore, the results indicate that the results based on the pooled model do indeed persist for each of the sample years examined.
•' * We also define ACMEET, ACSIZE, and ACIND as categorical variables rather than as continuous variables as in Abbott, Parker, and Peters 2004 and our results are consistent with the results in Table 5 . G. finds that auditors' industry expertise is associated with conservatism. When we include auditors' industry expertise and auditor tenure in (2), they are not significant. We follow procedures recommended by Belsley, Kuh, and Welsch 1980 in identifying outliers and our results are not sensitive to the exclusion of outliers.
Q score
The CONCSCO measure is based on Penman and Zhang's 2002 C score conservatism index. They also offer a measure of conservatism that impacts the income statement, designated as the Q score. It is a combination of the change in the C score and the industry (median) adjusted C score. Penman and Zhang (2002) refer to the Q score as an "eamings quality indicator". The Q score can be thought of as the unexpected C score and captures the effects of past conservatism. Penman and Zhang provide evidence that the Q score has predictive power for one-year ahead retum on net operating assets (RNOA) incremental to past RNOA. We use the Q score as an altemative measure of conservatism and estimate (2). The untabulated results indicate that the coefficient on AFINEXP is 0.112 and significant at the 0.05 level. NAFINEXP is negative and insignificant.'Ĉ ontrol for Arthur Andersen and exchange listing Next, we examine whether our results are driven by former clients of Arthur Andersen or firms not listed on the NYSE. We use a dummy variable that equals 1 for former Arthur Andersen clients and 0 for non-Andersen clients. We interact the dummy with AFINEXP and NAFINEXP. Untabulated results show that neither interaction is significant. The dummy variable is also insignificant. However, AFINEXP is positive and significant for CONACRUF, CONCSCO, and CONACRU. NAFINEXP is not significant. These results indicate that our results are not sensitive to former Andersen clients. A similar test indicates that our results are not sensitive to exchange listing.
Asymmetric loss recognition test
We also use Ball and Shivakumar's 2005 asymmetric loss recognition test, an alternative measure of conservatism. We run a regression of total accruals over total assets at the beginning of the year on positive cash flows, a dummy variable that equals 1 for negative cash fiows and 0 for positive cash fiows, and include AFINEXP and NAFINEXP as main effects and interact both variables with positive and negative cash fiows. The untabulated results indicate that although the interaction between NAFINEXP and negative cash fiows is insignificant, the interaction between AFINEXP and negative cash fiows is positive and significant at the 0.01 level, indicating that timely recognition of losses via accruals is greater, that is, more conservative for accounting financial experts. In short, these results are consistent with the notion that higher conservatism is associated with accounting financial expertise but not nonaccounting expertise.
Control for endogeneity
Prior research recognizes that attributes of corporate boards and govemance mechanisms are endogenously determined (Klein 2002b) . Building on a model developed by Agrawal and Chadha 2005, we examine whether our results persist after controlling for endogeneity. For firm performance we use an accounting measure (ROA) rather than stock retums. Similarly, for volatility we measure eamings volatility because one of our proxies for conservatism, CONBM, is highly correlated with any stock-related measure. We also add the GINDEX as of the beginning of the year. A high (low) GINDEX implies weak (strong) govemance. DeFond et al. (2005) find that the market reactions to the appointment of a financial expert to the audit committee are contingent upon existing govemance structure as measured by the GINDEX. Thus, we estimate the following model:
where FROA is the prior three-year average retum on assets; AEMP is a measure of capital intensity, computed as total assets divided by number of employees; EVOL is eamings volatility for the past six years; and AGE is the age of the firm from the date of listing in number of years. Other variables are the same as defined before. Following Agrawal and Chadha 2005, we predict a negative sign for ßi and ß^ and a positive sign for ß2, J83, ß^, ß^, ß^, and ßg. A negative relation is expected for ßj because a low GINDEX is consistent with good governance, including having experts on the audit committee. We run two specifications. Model (3A) does not include eamings volatility and firm age because both are strongly correlated with the book-to-market ratio. Model (3B) is the full model. Untabulated results indicate that, with the exception of DEBT and AEMF, signs for all the variables are in the expected direction. SIZE, PROA, BSIZE, GINDEX, EVOL, and AGE are significant at the 0.10 level or better. The pseudo R^for the full model is modest, but higher than the R^in Agrawal and Chadha 2005.16 Next, we replace AFINEXD with FFINEX, the predicted probability of having a financial expert on the audit committee and estimate (2). PFINEX is estimated using model (3B) for CONACRU, CONACRUF, and CONCSCO. For CONBM, we use both models (3A) and (3B). The untabulated results indicate that FFINEX is positive and significant at the 0.01 level for the accmal-based measures of conservatism and significant at the 0.10 level for CONCSCO. More importantly, results are significant at the 0.05 level for CONBM when earnings volatility and age are excluded in the first stage. NAFINEXF is not significant except for CONBM, where it is negative and significant at the 0.10 level. Overall, these findings are consistent with our hypothesis and alleviate concems that the reported results are driven by the endogenous relationship between conservatism and board attributes.
Conclusions
In response to several well-publicized accounting scandals and increases in restatements of financial statements, the U.S. Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act to enhance corporate govemance mechanisms and restore investor confidence in financial reporting. One aspect of corporate govemance that has received considerable attention is improving the effectiveness of the audit committee, the ultimate monitor of the financial reporting process. The SOX mandates the disclosure of whether at least one member of the audit committee is a financial expert. However, the final version of the rule adopted by the SEC defined experts to include both accounting and nonaccounting experts. Did the SEC do the right thing? Are the nonaccounting experts just as competent as the accounting experts in enhancing the quality of financial reporting? We examine the composition of the audit committees for a sample of S&P 500 firms and our results suggest that an audit committee's accounting financial expertise is positively associated with conservatism, a fundamental property of financial statements. This finding does not hold for nonaccounting financial experts or nonfinancial experts. We also find that the audit committee's financial experts are able to effectively perform their monitoring function and promote conservative accounting only when they are in boards that are characterized by strong govemance. In other words, the effect of accounting financial expertise is undermined by weak govemance mechanisms. The results are robust to altemative measures of conservatism iind controls for other characteristics of boards of directors. We also find that only accounting financial expertise is positively associated with Penman and Zhang's 2002 Q score, a measure of eamings quality. Overall, our findings are consistent with the notion that accounting expertise contributes to greater monitoring by the members of the audit committee, which in tum enhances multiple attributes of financial reporting quality.
Our findings add to the growing literature on the relation between audit committee's expertise and other measures of financial reporting quality, such as accmals-based eamings management and eamings restatements (Klein 2002a; Xie et al. 2003; Bedard et al. 2004; Agrawal and Chadha 2005) . Our findings have implications for regulators, corporate boards, and the accounting profession. Findings from concurrent research and this study suggest that adopting a narrower definition of a financial expert is likely to enhance the audit committees' effectiveness. Our findings are also relevant to regulators in other countries who are considering adopting measures to enhance corporate govemance, particularly the effectiveness of audit committees. The implication for boards of directors is that merely appointing an accounting expert to the audit committee without improving the overall govemance quality is not likely to enhance the effectiveness of the audit committee. Finally, our findings document an association rather than causation between an audit committee's expertise and conservatism. Our sample does not permit us to examine whether firms that replace nonaccounting experts with accounting experts exhibit greater conservatism. When more data become available, future research could examine whether and how our results change in the post-SOX period.
1. In contrast, the NYSE requires that at least one member of the audit committee have accounting or related financial management expertise and that all members of the audit committee be financially literate or become financially literate within a reasonable period of time after their appointment to the audit committee. Similarly, the NASDAQ rules require that all members of the audit committee be able to read and understand financial statements at the time of their appointment. Furthermore, companies must certify whether at least one member of the audit committee has past employment experience in finance or accounting, requisite professional certification in accounting, or any other comparable experience or background that results in the individual's financial sophistication, including being or having been a CEO, CFO, or other senior officer with financial oversight responsibilities (NYSE 2004; NASDAQ 2004) .
2. Dennis Beresford, a former chairman of the Financial Accounting Standards Board, expresses concern that a large number of companies may have appointed nonaccounting experts to the audit committees. He further cautions that most CEOs do not have specific knowledge of generally accepted accounting principles, SEC regulations, or Public Company Accounting Oversight Board auditing standards and must depend heavily on the finance executives and auditors of the companies on whose boards they sit (Beresford 2005) .
3. There is a growing literature on accounting conservatism (Ball, Kothari, and Robin 2000; Givoly and Hayn 2000; Bushman and Piotroski 2006; Givoly, Hayn, and Natarajan 2007; Lobo and Zhou 2006) . 4. Beekes, Pope, and Young (2004) find evidence that U.K. firms with a higher proportion of outside directors tend to recognize bad news in eamings on a timely basis. The authors do not examine audit committee characteristics, such as independence, number of meetings, and members' accounting expertise. 5. We use Ball and Shivakumar's 2005 asymmetric loss recognition test (conditional conservatism) because it is less controversial than Basu's 1997 reverse regression framework. Following Givoly, Hayn, and Natarajan's 2007 suggestion, we use multiple proxies to measure conservatism. 6. Our study differs from prior research in many ways. Xie et al. (2003) do not distinguish between accounting and nonaccounting financial expertise. Unlike Bedard et al. 2004 , we include board independence and CEO duality in our models to tease out the incremental effect of the audit committee's expertise. Also, both Xie et al. (2003) and Bedard et al. (2004) do not address endogeneity issues in board characteristics and govemance mechanisms. Furthermore, Bedard et al. (2004) focus on a sample of 200 firms with extreme positive and negative abnormal accruals and caution that their results may not be generalizable for firms with lower levels of eamings management. Agrawal and Chadha (2005) also do not distinguish between accounting and nonaccounting financial expertise. Also, they study only firms restating their financial statements. Thus, it is not clear whether their findings are generalizable to firms that are not involved in aggressive forms of financial reporting. A focus on firms that do not restate financial statements but might otherwise engage in less aggressive financial reporting is important because those firms are representative of the population of firms.
Finally, J. focuses only on firms that changed their auditors. We do not impose such a restriction. 7. This argument is consistent with evidence from behavioral research that individuals with significant financial experience have knowledge of misstatement occurrences in financial statement accounts and underlying causes of misstatements (Libby 1985; Ashton 1991; Solomon, Shields, and Whittington 1999). 8. Carcello, Hermanson, and Neal (2002) analyze disclosures in audit committee charters and find that about half of the audit committee charters examined disclose that the audit committee reviews or approves accounting changes, indicating that audit committees attempt to infiuence financial reporting quality. Furthermore, Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 90, Audit Committee Communications, requires that the auditor discuss with the audit committee the auditor's judgement about the quality, not just the acceptability, of the company's accounting principles employed in its financial reporting and encourages a three-way discussion among the auditor, management, and the audit committee.
9. Ahmed et al. (2002) average over a six-year period. We use a three-year period because we do not have COMPUSTAT data for all firms for the year 2005. 10. See Petersen 2007 for a discussion of year dummies. 11. The Huber-White i-statistic is lower than the OLS unadjusted /-statistic for AFINEXP.
For example, when the dependent variable is CONACRU, the unadjusted i-statistics and White t for AFINEXP are, respectively, 2.25 and 2.20 (compared with the HuberWhite/of 1.73). 12. We thank an anonymous referee for this suggestion. 13. We also consider altemative cutoff values to provide some evidence on the sensitivity of our results to specific thresholds. We remeasure SGOV with the following modifications. For BSIZE and ACSIZE, instead of the median we use a 66 percent cutoff; for BIND we change the cutoff from 60 percent to 50 percent or 70 percent; for GINDEX and INSTOWN we use 66 percent instead of the median cutoff. The results are not sensitive to these modifications. Finally, without modifying the individual components of SGOV, we modify the cutoff for SGOV from the median to 66 percent. Again, the results are similar. These findings provide some assurance that the results reported in Table 6 also hold when altemative cutoff values are used. 14. We also attempt to examine the association between the changes in an audit committee's expertise and the change in conservatism. However, the ability to do this analysis is limited by the small number of changes in members of the audit committee, specifically members who are accounting financial experts. We find that all conservatism measures, except CONACRUF, register a higher increase for firms that appoint a new director with accounting financial expertise as compared with firms that let go of such directors. Although this is consistent with expectations, the differences are not statistically significant.
15. We also conduct tests of real eamings management (Roychowdhury 2006) and find that only accounting financial expertise consu-ains real eamings management. Those results are not reported for the sake of brevity. 16. The percentage correctly classified by the model is 79 percent for model (3 A) and 80 percent for model (3B).
